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Abstract

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are attempts to overwhelm a
computer system in order to deny access by legitimate users. They are generally
unstoppable, but there is a good deal of on-going research on methods to reduce their
negative effects. This paper will deal with the design of a model that simulates such an
attack. The simulation model is then used to study possible ways to defend against these
attacks. Three experiments are run: 1) using a priority queue to sort messages from
clients based on how many connections they have open on the server; 2) limiting the
number of connections each client can create; and 3) having the server forcefully delete
the oldest established connection, whenever its connection table becomes full. Results
show that method 1 is totally ineffective while method 2 somewhat improves the overall
performance of the system. However, method 3, combined with method 2, produces
significantly improved performance against a DDoS attack.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Analogy

Imagine a telephone system which can handle a certain number of calls at any one
time. A person, either intentionally (having many telephones at his* disposal and using all
of them at the same time) or unknowingly (placing a lot of legitimate calls at the same
time), could hog all the available slots, preventing any other person from being able to
place a call. This analogy is similar to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. It tries to use up
all the resources of a server or client computer, preventing legitimate use of that system.
A DoS attacker is usually using only one computer for the attack. However, a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack occurs when many computers attack a single one, and it
is much more common nowadays.

1.2 Why?

With the current popularity of the Internet, most computers are connected to the
Internet via a high speed connection. A DDoS attack could be happening at any time.

* Note that “his” and “he” is used. However, this does not indicate that the person is male. “he” is used
for simplicity.
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Similar to the analogy of the telephone system, a DDoS attack could also be happening
through legitimate use of the Internet. A special phrase is used to denote when this is
happening – flash crowds. A DoS attack can thus be defined as an overload that causes
resources to be fully utilized by the attack and thus prevent the use of a computer or
application. A DDoS attack achieves the same result as a DoS attack but in a more
distributed and coordinated way, requiring multiple “attackers” or computers. Thus it is
much harder to defend against.
Although the real reasons behind a DDoS attack is rarely or never known because
the attacker is very seldom caught. Some potential reasons are
●

Fame
Fame within the hacker community is really important for attackers.

●

Financial
Newspapers report that gambling websites have to pay a certain amount of money
per month to blackmailers else their websites will be flooded and inaccessible.
The amount paid is thought to be less than the amount they would lose should
their websites go down. Competitive companies might also attack each other in an
effort to bring down the other company's website. If a popular website is down for
even only an hour, that company might lose hundreds of customers and
potentially thousands of dollars.

●

Political
Some country might want to cripple another country's servers for some reasons.

●

Military
3

It might be a good idea to overload a sensitive or critical military server during
times of wars.
A DDoS attack comes in all flavors and shapes. Each specific attack and its
corresponding defense, if any, will be explained later in this paper.
Distributed Denial of Service attacks have often been coined as unstoppable
[Farrow, n.d.] [Lau et al, 2000]. The attacks are often classified or further divided into
three categories: detection, prevention, and traceability. Detection is about knowing when
a DDoS attack is happening, and alerting the appropriate individuals, such as the network
administrator, system administrator, and the ISP (Internet Service Provider). To stop such
an attack, manual intervention is required. Prevention is a mostly automatic intervention
in trying to stop the attack. Both detection and prevention techniques suffer from false
positives. Traceability is trying to trace back where the attack came from. The IP
addresses of the attacking computers are very often spoofed or faked. The real attacker
has to be traced back and this is often very hard to impossible due to the very nature of
the Internet.
This thesis will focus more on the prevention aspects with a little bit of detection.
Only the TCP connection will be simulated. The research will focus on trying to prevent
evil clients from even establishing a connection and allowing availability for good
clients. The very basic connection will be simulated, and then prevention features will be
added to see whether they provide any help in abating the attack(s) and denying service
and connectivity to the evil clients, while providing a constant and good service to the
good clients.

4

1.3 Examples
There are many Internet-related attacks going on every day. There is probably an
attempted attack on one or more Macalester College systems right now. Denial of Service
attacks probably represent a fair share of these attacks. DDoS attacks happened before
and some examples are briefly listed below:
●

A University of Minnesota computer was knocked off for more than two days
in August 1999, when a DDoS tool called Trinoo was deployed in more than
200 attacking computers.

●

In February 2000, Yahoo!, Amazon.com, CNN.com, and other major Web
sites were brought down due to a distributed attack [Lau et al, 2000].

●

On October 21, 2002, the root Domain Name System (DNS) servers were
“pinged to death” for an hour.

●

Gibson Research Corporation (http://www.grc.com) was brought down in
May 2001.

●

On May, 22 2001, CERT (widely regarded as the “Fork Knox of computer
security”) was knocked off the Internet.

●

The Code Red worm in 2001 is also regarded as a DDoS attack.

●

In March 2005, on the very first day of its public release, the Sun Grid was hit
by a DDoS attack.

Since 1998, there have probably been hundreds of DoS attacks around the world.
In 2001, “a quantitative estimate of worldwide DoS attack frequency found 12,000
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attacks over a three-week period” [Carl et al, 2006]. Moreover, the 2004 CSI/FBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey “listed DoS attacks among the most financially
expensive security incidents” [Carl et al, 2006].
A Distributed Denial of Service attack is very real and is a significant threat.

1.4 DDoS Attacks
A Distributed Denial of Service attack can occur in many ways. Some are known
as 'brute force' attacks. Others exploit a specific weakness in the network protocol, while
some exploit a weakness in a specific application program. A DoS attack does not always
have to occur on a server, or be targeted at a server. Some attacks exploit weaknesses in
an application run on clients or on the average user's computers, causing the latter to
crash and stop functioning.
A list of some of the most well-known types of DoS attacks are described below.
1) Brute Force
A brute force attack usually just tries to eat up all resources by overloading a
server with requests. One example would be a thousand computers trying to
access the Macalester website repeatedly every millisecond. This would prevent
any legitimate use of the website by any other users. There is no attempt at
subtlety – just a flooding of requests to a single system. This is much like the
attempt to overwhelm a plumbing system by turning on every tap on campus at
the same time!
6

2) TCP SYN
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) requires a three way handshake before
a connection can be established. A client sends an initial connect request to a
server. When the server receives the request, it acknowledges (acks) back to the
client. When the latter receives the ack, the connection has now been established
for the client, but not for the server. The client thus sends an ack back to the
server. When the latter receives the ack, the connection has been established for
both the client and the server and transmission of data can begin. This three way
handshake is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Three way handshake of TCP

The TCP SYN exploit is for a client to send an initial connect request to a server,
and although the server acks back, the client never acks back to the server. This
leaves the server waiting for an acknowledgment that will never arrive. However,
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that initiated connection entry on the server will eventually time-out and be
removed from the table, which will free up a port on the server for another
connection to be created. The distributed attack is to have hundreds of malicious
clients sending an initial connection request to the same server without sending
any acknowledgments. Each connection created on the server takes up a port
number and there are only 2^16 ports available on any computer nowadays.
Eventually, the server will timeout those connections but for a brief amount of
time, no other clients can access the server. In a sense, this attack succeeds by
using up all connection table entries for a brief period of time.
3) LAND Attack
"A LAND attack is a DoS attack that consists of sending a special spoofed packet
to a computer, causing it to lock up. The security flaw was first discovered in
1997 by someone using the alias 'm3lt', and it has resurfaced many years later in
operating systems such as Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP SP2." [Land
Attacks Still Going Strong, 2005] The spoofed packet is an ICMP (Internet
Control Message Protocol) echo packet that has the same source and destination
address. The system that receives this packet will just stall and will not know
what to do with that packet. After a timeout, that packet will usually be discarded.
The word “LAND” is used because the first variant of this attack required the
attacker to be on site, but nowadays this attack can be performed remotely.
4) Teardrop Attack
The maximum size of a packet over the Internet is 65536 bytes. Some messages
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can be much larger than 65000 bytes and must be fragmented, that is broken
down into smaller pieces and sent individually via different routes, when the
separate pieces arrive at the destination they are reassembled back into a single
logical message. This could be the source of a potential attack. The server holds
all the fragments until they can be reassembled. This uses up space in the server's
table. A malicious user could send a lot of packets which cannot be reassembled,
causing the table to become full and the server rejecting all other packets.
Timeouts do help, but just as for the TCP SYN exploit, this prevents legitimate
use of resources for a certain period of time. This situation is illustrated in Figure
2, in which three messages M, N, and P – each four fragments long, are all
partially arrived but no single message is complete. No new fragments or
messages can be processed by the system until the table (also known as a buffer)
is freed.
M1 M2 M3
N1 P1 N3
P2 P3 N2
Figure 2: Full Message Buffer

5) Smurf Attack
Every computer on the Internet can be identified by its Internet Protocol (IP)
address. The latter is unique for each computer, except for some reserved IP
addresses which every router knows about. A malicious computer could spoof its
IP address, so that its IP address appears to be the IP address of the victim
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computer. The latter will then be overloaded with unrequested packets or
messages which might cause it to crash. Figure 3 gives an example. The victim's
computer IP address is 141.140.1.5 and the attacker's real IP address is
141.140.121.111. However, the attacker masquerades its IP address as
141.140.1.5 and sends a message to computer 64.236.24.12. The latter replies
back to the spoofed IP address (141.140.1.5). This seems rather benign but if
thousands of attacking computers perform such a smurf attack, the victim will be
overloaded with messages from the same innocent computer (64.236.24.12).
However, that computer could be a valid and legitimate system trying to surf the
Internet peacefully, but it could be barred from connecting to 141.140.1.5 for no
apparent reason.

Figure 3: Smurf Attack

6) Email overflow
One of the oldest types of DoS attack is to fill up an email server's disk space
preventing any other emails from being received. A lot of emails can be sent to an
10

email server, which will store all of them until the user retrieves them. If a
sufficient amount of email is sent, this will fill up all free disk space on the server,
and all future emails will be discarded. However, this is easily countered
nowadays with Spam blockers and cheap and easily available disk space.
Moreover, when the server's disk is filled up to a certain percentage, it could alert
the system administrator.
7) Broadcast
Many routers have a broadcast capability for testing and other purposes. This
capability sends an ICMP packet to every computer connected to the router. A
malicious user could send a broadcast message to a router, which will then
broadcast it on end. This could potentially flood a network with packets.
However, many routers have this 'feature' turned off. Also, there is software that
can prioritize packets and give higher priority to TCP packets and lower priority
to ICMP packets thus thwarting this type of attack (http://www.packeteer.com).
8) Flash Crowds
A non malicious example of an almost unstoppable distributed denial of service
attack is flash crowds. As its name implies, flash crowds occur when numerous
legitimate users try to connect to a particular server, eventually flooding it with
more requests than it can manage, leaving other users unable to access the server.
This often happens following an important news, sports, or entertainment event
when millions of legitimate users attempt to access the same site. For example,
this is what happened to all major news broadcast web sites right after 9/11. Flash
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crowds also occur after what is commonly known as the Slashdot effect
(http://slashdot.org is a popular news website).
9) Physical Attack
There is of course the possibility of a physical DoS attack, such as an attacker
physically cutting an Ethernet cable, or setting fire to the server building. This
paper will not elaborate more on these types of physical attack, nor with the
possible defenses. Only DoS attacks based on software assaults will be dealt with.
10) Other exploits
Many other DoS attacks are possible which exploit certain weaknesses in some
applications. Some of the most interesting ones are briefly listed below:
1. There have been numerous buffer overflow exploits in which applications
crash because they cannot handle incoming messages/instructions.
2. A recent (December 2005) exploit in the newly released Mozilla Firefox 1.5
could prevent further use of the web browser until its history.dat file was
erased.
3. Viruses and worms can crash computers and deny their legitimate use by
users. They also clog up network bandwidth.
There are many tools available that can exploit some of the weaknesses mentioned
above and which can simulate an overload of requests. Some of those tools are Tribe,
Tribe Floodnet, Trinoo, TFN2K, Stacheldraht, and Shaft, and they are all freely available
on the Internet. These are all highly specialized tools aimed at creating a Distributed
Denial of Service attack. Most of them work by first infecting a victim computer with
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some sort of a Trojan, and then the attacker can remotely control those infected
computers to launch a massive DDoS attack on unsuspecting systems. A Trojan is a type
of virus that opens a back door in a computer to allow a malicious user to gain complete
control of the computer at a later time. It is similar to the Trojan horse in Greek
mythology.
There are also other packages that can test the performance of a server. Such
examples include hping, fping, nmap, and nessus. Although those tools are meant for
security purposes, they can also be used by malicious users to find weaknesses in or
attack a system.
Moreover, you can buy a product from a company that will test your network and
its performance and ensure that your system is secure. Examples include, but are not
limited to, http://www.ixiacom.com, and http://dast.nlanr.net/projects/advisor/.

1.5 Defenses
Someone once said “All programs are buggy”. This means that no program ever
written is perfect. Security holes, omitted tests or checks, and other weaknesses will
eventually be found and exploited. Although one cannot rely on any programs, protocols,
or systems to be completely secure from attacks, there are steps that can be taken to
prevent a DoS or DDoS attack.
1) The simplest defense step is of course to patch software as manufacturers
or developers make them available. However, some patches might be the
13

cause for an attack. Some patches, for example in the Sendmail program,
would automatically reset settings back to default values without alerting
the system administrator. These default settings could pose a security risk.
Thus, patches should not be applied blindly.
2) Common and logical defenses also have to be applied such as not
downloading any attachments or random programs, installing antispyware, anti-virus, and firewall programs.
3) IP broadcasting on routers should to be disabled if this feature is not to be
used. In some cases, for example a print server broadcasting a “I am
printer A. Who wants to use me?” message regularly, this cannot be
avoided.
4) Unused services on clients and especially servers should be disabled.
Many Linux distributions come with services (SSH, FTP, Samba) turned
on.
5) Filtering routers can be used. They could bolster security and help against
IP spoofing. Ingress filtering means making sure that all outbound
connections from behind the firewall have a valid IP address. Egress
filtering means making sure that all inbound connections are coming from
the correct place. This does not work if other routers don't use filtering.
6) Although firewalls are good at blocking and filtering packets, and even at
protecting the operating system with the newer combined network and OS
firewalls, they will only do what they are told and if a system is
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compromised, they would not be able to detect or protect it anymore. This
is where Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) come in. They can use
signature-based defenses (similar to what most anti-virus software use to
detect viruses) to detect and prevent against any known attacks. They can
also use heuristic scanning to monitor the processes and the regular usage
of a system. If the usage on that system changes significantly, they can
alert the system administrator.
7) Network connections are ephemeral and a network administrator has to
keep track of what computer is connecting to where, which requests are
being sent to the server, and many other network-related tracking.
Network monitoring is thus very important for an administrator to detect a
premature attack, detect port scanning which are usually a prelude to an
attack (although [Vijayan, 2005] shows that this only happens for about
5% of the time), and just to simply monitor network traffic. In some
companies, email can be filtered so that important and classified
information are not sent outside of the company's network.
8) Many servers are Linux. Since the latter is open source, there are dozens
of available Linux distributions which vary from Fedora to EnGarde to
Ubuntu to SuSE. Although they all use the same kernel, some distributions
have been designed with security from bottom to top. One example is
EnGarde (http://www.engardelinux.org) which has been designed with
security in mind and geared towards the server end of the market.
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9) The honeynet project can be used to track down zombie networks. A
zombie (or botnet) is a system that has been infected and is being used by
attackers to potential launch massive attacks. A group of infected systems
constitutes a zombie network. A honeypot acts like a bait to draw attacks
to it so that security experts can analyze the attacks and apply the
appropriate defenses.
10) Physical security is also of the utmost importance to protect against
attacks.
Although many of the defenses described above are useful against general attacks,
not all of them will work specifically for a denial of service attack, and they are even less
likely to work against a distributed denial of service attack. A DoS attack against a server
is quite easy to defend against. The network administrator can block the IP address of the
offending computer, and it is much easier to track down one computer than to try to track
down thousands. The simplest defense is of course to just buy more hard disk and
memory and processing space and power, and that usually works for bigger companies.
However, that approach does not work all the time, and this paper will investigate the
inherent problems in a DDoS attack and try to come out with the best possible defense
against it.
There are many problems in designing a good defense mechanism against a
Distributed Denial of Service attack.
1) One of the most common types of DDoS attacks is to just overload a
server with requests. However, that is the exact same definition of a flash
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crowd event. It is difficult to distinguish a DDoS attack from a flash crowd
event.
2) Although the attack is distributed, that is, many computers participate,
defenses are usually solo and not distributed. A distributed defense,
sharing the load and information with other servers/computers, might
produce a better defense against this type of attack.
3) There is a lack of detailed information available when a DDoS attack
occurs. More information would include how many computers were used,
where they are found geographically, and what weaknesses, if any, were
exploited.
4) Although there is a taxonomy available to classify DDoS attacks and
defenses [Mirkovic et al, 2004], there is no current DDoS defense
available, therefore there is no benchmark available to determine whether
a new product for a DDoS defense is suitable or not.
5) It is very difficult to test software against a DDoS attack. A particular
defense could be implemented and be successful when 1000 unique
computers are used. However, it might fail if 1001 or 100,000 computers
were used.
6) There are economic and social factors involved as to why there is
currently no widely accepted DDoS defense mechanisms. Although DDoS
attacks are common, many companies do not want to disclose the attacks
to public knowledge for fear of bad publicity. Defenses against such
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attacks are currently mostly of interest in academic research, not applied
security. Morever, DoS attack techiniques are analogous to viruses.
Attackers change their signature patterns and defense techniques have to
be updated to reflect the latest types of attacks.
There are new defense tools to protect against a DDoS attack. However, there is
no benchmark and although the developers claim the tool will help, there is no proof of
concept so far. Some examples of those commercial tools are RAZOR
(http://www.bindview.com/Services/Razor/), Mu Security (http://www.musecurity.com/),
and Melior Inc. (http://www.ddos.com/).
Moreover, there are some freely available tools to detect and prevent the use of
the “attacking” tools, such as gag – a stacheldraht scanner, and dds – a
Trinoo/TFN/stacheldraht agent scanner. Other software are also available to track down
the source IP, but none of those tools necessarily provide complete protection against a
DDoS attack. In fact, there is currently no way to stop such an attack, but there are ways
to try to mitigate it.

1.6 Similar Work
When a DDoS attack occurs, there are three main parts in the defense:
1) Detection: The attack has to be detected first. The simplest way to determine that
an attack is under way is to check the bandwidth of the network and the usage of
computers, as compared to a normal day.
18

2) Prevention: After the attack has been detected, it has to be stopped or mitigated so
that normal use of the services can continue. Although there are currently no
known prevention techniques, some steps are to use a firewall and IDS, and also
seek the help of the ISP to filter the “evil” packets. This paper will deal mainly in
prevention methods.
3) Tracking: The attackers have to be tracked down so that necessary measures can
be taken – block them, try to contact the users/owners, or trace them for judicial
issues. The IP Source Tracker implemented in most Cisco routers can be useful.
Although the attacking computers can be traced back, it does not mean that they
can dealt with. International laws might apply and there might language and
culture issues.

DDoSVax (http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/~ddosvax/) is a research project for
developing detection and prevention techniques. The network simulator ns-2
(http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/) can also be used to simulate a real network and try to
implement prevention methods.

1.7 This Paper
This paper will deal with simulating a computer network where various clients –
both good and evil clients – connect to various servers. Ways in which the server can
counteract against the evil clients while providing good service to the good clients will be
19

researched.
Chapter 2 will explain how the network simulator works and how it is
implemented.
Chapter 3 will show the base case against which all experiments are compared.
Chapter 4 will describe the first experiment performed – using a priority queue.
Chapter 5 will detail the second experiment performed – limiting the number of
connections per client.
Chapter 6 will describe the third experiment performed – using a server reset.
Chapter 7 will conclude and explain what worked and what did not and why.
Chapter 8 will provide some future research that could be undertaken related to
this paper and also provide other guidelines related to Distributed Denial of Service
attacks.
Chapter 9 and 10 will deal with references and acknowledgments.
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2. Network Simulation

2.1 Introduction

A complete connection-establishment network simulation is designed and built.
Only the three way handshake connection establishment process is simulated. The four
way handshake connection termination, data transfer, and other negotiations are not
simulated. Only ways to prevent malicious clients from establishing a connection will be
investigated in this paper.
The network simulation is a discrete event-driven model. It consists of virtual
computers, which will make up the basis of the simulation. Each computer can be divided
into two categories: server or client. Furthermore, a client can be either a good client or
an evil client. The client's purpose is hidden from the server and is only used for
statistical purposes.
Moreover, data packets are not actually simulated nor sent, so once a client
establishes a connection, there is no actual sending of data or packets or messages, but it
is assumed that the data is sent and received and processed, and after a certain amount of
time t, whatever needed to be done (for example delivery of a web page, or transferring
of a file) has been completed.
When a timeout occurs, the connection is just deleted. There is no retransmission
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of messages, or trying to reestablish a connection.

2.2 Example

Each computer in the simulation can be either a client or a server. A client sends
requests to the server to create connections. The server just accepts connections from
clients. The server is the focus of this paper, as it will become under attack by clients.
Each computer contains a connection table, an inbound message queue, and an
outbound message queue.
The connection table holds a list of all the connections – either “in progress” or
“established”. The inbound message queue is a First In First Out (FIFO) queue, where the
first message in will be the first message out to be processed. This queue is used for
messages incoming to the computer only. The outbound message queue is also a FIFO
queue, and is only used for outgoing messages from the computer. Both queues hold
messages until the computer can process them. Queues are needed because it takes a
finite amount of time to process a message to determine what it is, who the sender and
receiver are, etc...
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Figure 4: Main Components of the Simulator

There are two types of clients – evil and good. Evil clients act exactly like good
clients except in two circumstances. Evil clients never tell the server that they are done
with a connection, and thus when an evil client creates a new connection in the server's
connection table, that connection stays in the table for the duration of the simulation.
Good clients, on the other hand, reset or terminate every connection they establish. The
other difference is that evil clients send more connection requests, and thus more
messages, to the server than good clients do.
The following is an example of a simulation run:
●

Client A wants to establish a connection with server S. Client A thus creates a
new Initial Connect message, M1 and puts it in its outbound message queue.
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Figure 5: Initial Connect Request

●

That message is processed and sent to the server S. A new entry in the client's
connection table is created for that new connection. That entry is “in progress”.

Figure 6: Creation of New Connection for Client

●

After a certain amount of time (called the interval time), client A creates another
Initial Connect message, M' to the server.

●

After the message M1 has been processed and sent, the server S will eventually
receive message M1 from client A after a delay time (transmission time).
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●

Since the server's inbound message queue is empty and its inbound processor is
idle, message M1 is processed right away. If the processor was busy, the message
would have been put in the queue to be processed later. If the queue is full, the
message is just dropped.

Figure 7: Receive Initial Connect Message

●

After the processing time (which is needed to determine what message it is, and
who the sender and receiver are), the server attempts to create a new entry in the
its connection table. If the table is full, no new connection is created. The new
connection is “in progress”. The latter is also marked to be from client A and from
index 1 (client A might have multiple connections).
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Figure 8: Creation of New Connection for Server

●

If a new connection has been created, the server creates a new Ack Client
message, M2 to acknowledge the receipt of the initial request from client A. The
message is put in the outbound message queue, processed, and sent.

Figure 9: Ack Client Message

●

After a delay time, the client receives the message from the server. The message
is put in the inbound message queue of the client, and processed. The message has
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now been determined to be an acknowledgment. The client's connection table is
queried to find the corresponding connection for that message. If it is not found,
an error is reported for that client. If the connection is found, it is updated so that
the server is marked to be S and the index used on server S is 1. The connection is
now “established” on the client's side.

Figure 10: Updating Connection for Client
●

The client now creates an Ack Server message, M3 and adds it to its outbound
message queue for processing.

●

After processing, the message is sent to the server.

●

After the reset time (reset time is the time it takes for the Ack Server message to
travel from the client to the server, for the server to process the message, and send
the appropriate data back. The data could be, for example, a web page), the client
creates a Client Reset message M4, adds it to its outbound message queue,
processes the message, and sends it to the server.

●

After the delay time, the server receives the Ack Server message M3 from the
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client. The message is put in the inbound message queue and processed.
●

The server has now determined that the message is an acknowledgment to the
acknowledgment it sent earlier. It thus tries to find the corresponding connection
in its connection table. If the connection is not found, an error is reported for the
server. If the connection is found, the latter is now “established”. The three-way
handshake connection establishment procedure is now over.

Figure 11: Update Connection for Server

●

After the reset time and the delay time, the server receives the Client Reset
message M4. The latter is queued in the inbound message queue and processed.

28

Figure 12: Receive Client Reset Message

●

The server has now determined that the message is a reset to an earlier created
connection. It thus queries its connection table for the corresponding connection.
Once found, that connection is deleted. If not found, an error is reported for the
server.

The four-way handshake connection termination procedure is not simulated
because this paper is only interested in connection establishments. Thus, a reset without
any acknowledgements is sufficient.
A timeout is also scheduled after a new connection is created. It is discarded if the
connection is updated/established or removed. If the timeout does occur, the connection
in the connection table is deleted. No reset or other message is sent to indicate to the
other computer that the connection has timed out.
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2.3 Goals

The main goal of this simulation is to keep the server running even while under
attack from a distributed network of malicious clients, and also being available to good
clients. Evil clients can also be blocked or prevented from connecting to the server.
To achieve this goal, a set of parameters has to be well-defined. As mentioned in
Chapter 2.2, there are a lot of variables. The real-world or at least a good approximation
value of those variables need to be set, and if needed, tweaked to achieve a better result.
Moreover, a number of good clients will be connecting to a server, so that the latter starts
to get busy. Evil clients are then added into the simulation, and defense techniques
developed to still try to achieve the same availability and dependability as when the
simulation was without any evil clients. The result would be to try to maximize the
number of good clients serviced, while trying to minimize the number of evil clients
serviced. Since the server does not know which clients are good or evil, it will have to act
upon what it knows already.

2.4 Technical Details

2.4.1 Software Used
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The whole network simulator was built from the ground up using Java. IntelliJ
IDE (Integrated Development Environment) by JetBrains was used to improve efficiency,
easier debugging, decrease development time, and make refactoring easy. Moreover, testfirst programming was applied, as unit tests were developed first before the actual code is
written. JUnit was used for the unit tests. This is to ensure that each and every piece of
code is working as it should. An automated end-to-end test was not implemented, but the
simulation was assumed to be working correctly by going through each event one at a
time and making sure that the simulator was doing what it was supposed to do.

2.4.2 Time Units

Since Java is very bad at dealing with decimals, the time is not represented as a
double, but rather as an integer. Since the simulator produces a discrete event-driven
simulation, each event happens at discrete time and is processed sequentially. Even if two
events happen to occur at exactly the same time, the first one will be dealt with first, then
the second one. Therefore, it is acceptable to use integers as time units instead of
portraying real time in seconds or minutes. However, 10,000 time units is equal to 1
second.
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2.4.3 Events

A heap is used to store all the different events, arranged in chronological order.
The whole simulation is event-driven, not time-driven. Therefore, there must always be
an event in the heap. All clients create new events to establish a connection with a server.
The end of the simulation is indicated by a Terminate event. The seven main types of
events are Initial Connect, Ack Client, Ack Server, Reset, Timeout, Terminate, and
Measure events. Additionally, the first four are further divided into four events:
●

Create – The event has just been created and added to the outbound message
queue. When the message is to be processed, a Send event is scheduled on the
heap.

●

Send – The message related to the event is being processed, and a Receive event
is scheduled on the heap.

●

Receive – The message related to the event has just arrived at the destination and
is added to the inbound message queue. When the message is ready to be
processed, an End event is scheduled on the heap.

●

End – The message related to the event is being processed at the receiver's side.
Depending on what event that is, further events can be scheduled.

Therefore, all the events possible in the simulation are:
●

Initial Connect – Create, Send, Receive, End
A client wants to establish a connection with a server, and sends an initial connect
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request. This event can only be created by a client and sent to a server.
●

Ack Client – Create, Send, Receive, End
A server has received an initial connect request from a client and sends an
acknowledgment. This event can only be created by a server and sent to a client.

●

Ack Server – Create, Send, Receive, End
A client has received the acknowledgment from the server and sends back its own
acknowledgment. This event can only be created by a client and sent to a server.

●

Reset – Create, Send, Receive, End
A reset event can be created by either a client or a server and sent to the opposite
computer (client to server or server to client). Its function is to delete the
connection from the sender and indicate that it wants the connection deleted at the
receiver.

●

Timeout
A connection has timed out in a connection table. The latter could belong to either
a server or a client, the connection is just deleted from the connection table.

●

Terminate
The end of the simulation.

●

Measure
Regular events that take a snapshot of the simulation. It is used for statistics
gathering.
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2.4.4 Distributions

In the simulation, just like the real world, it must be really a coincidence for two
things to happen at exactly the same time. For example, a message sent from a client to a
server at time t would take f seconds, but a second message sent from a client to a server
at the same time t might take g seconds, where f is not equal to g.
Most time variables follow an exponential random distribution, given by
( - log (r) * mean ), where mean is the mean time provided, and r is a random
number and 0 <= r < 1
This returns a double (or a decimal number). The extra decimals can be truncated
to return just an integer.

2.4.5 Parameters

As mentioned before, the simulator requires a lot of variables. All the different
parameters that can be changed in the simulator is given below.
General Configuration
measurementInterval

100,000

The Measurement Interval (10 seconds)

terminate

18,000,000 The Termination Time (30 minutes)

verbose

false

Whether to go into verbose/debugging
mode

delayTime

20,000

The mean delay/transmission time (2
seconds)
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Server Configuration
numServers

1

The number of servers

computeSendTimeServer

10

The time to process an outgoing message

computeReceiveTimeServer

10

The time to process an incoming
message

connectionTableSizeServer

250

The size of the connection table

timeoutServer

300,000

The timeout value (30 seconds)

inQueueSizeServer

500

The size of the inbound message queue

outQueueSizeServer

500

The size of the outbound message queue

numClientsGood

1

The number of good clients

computeSendTimeClientGood

10

The time to process an outgoing message

Good Clients Configuration

computeReceiveTimeClientGood 10

The time to process an incoming
message

connectionTableSizeClientGood 50

The size of the connection table

timeoutClientGood

300,000

The timeout value (30 seconds)

inQueueSizeClientGood

100

The size of the inbound message queue

outQueueSizeClientGood

100

The size of the outbound message queue

intervalTimeClientGood

200,000

The interval time between initial connect
requests (20 seconds)

resetTimeClientGood

600,000

The time after which a client reset
message is sent (60 seconds)

numClientsEvil

0

The number of evil clients

computeSendTimeClientEvil

10

The time to process an outgoing message

computeReceiveTimeClientEvil

10

The time to process an incoming
message

connectionTableSizeClientEvil

5,000

The size of the connection table

timeoutClientEvil

300,000

The timeout value (30 seconds)

inQueueSizeClientEvil

100

The size of the inbound message queue

outQueueSizeClientEvil

100

The size of the outbound message queue

intervalTimeClientEvil

40,000

The interval time between initial connect
requests (4 seconds)

Evil Clients Configuration
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resetTimeClientEvil

-1

No client reset is sent

Table 1: Parameters

Even though all the variables can be changed for every simulation run, most of
them are fixed because they are the real values used in the different servers currently in
use around the world. Macalester College's (http://www.macalester.edu) web and email
server's settings were obtained from the current network administrator, and those values
are used. A more detailed description of each parameter and what the default or set-in
value is is given below.
●

measurementInterval = 100000
Every 100,000 time units (10 seconds), a measure event is scheduled which takes
a snapshot of the current state of the message queues and connection table of the
servers. Since each simulation is run for 18,000,000, a total of 180 measurements
are taken which are deemed sufficient.

●

terminate = 18000000
18,000,000 equals to 30 minutes and that time is neither too short when nothing
exciting happens nor too long when the simulation will take too long and not yield
any further interesting results.

●

verbose = false
If verbose is true, then each event's occurrence will be displayed along with its
information. Unless the simulation has to be debugged, only the output of the
results is needed, which is the statistics gathered during the simulation run.
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●

delayTime = 20000
This is the mean time it takes a message to travel from a computer (either client or
server) to another computer (either client or server). This is 2 seconds in real time
and it follows the exponential random distribution aforementioned. A mean time
of two seconds is thought to be about analogous to the time it would take in the
real world.

●

numServers = 1
Although the simulation could have been run using more servers, only one is
needed because the results would have been the same for the different servers. If a
more real-world model has been simulated, then more servers would have been
needed, but for the simple simulation for this thesis, one server is sufficient.

●

ComputeSendTimeServer = 10
The compute send time is the time it takes the server to process an outgoing
message and send it on its way to the client. 10 time units is 1 millisecond.
Although no information could be obtained about how fast a computer or router
takes to process a message, 1 millisecond has been correct for the simulation. The
compute send time is the same for all clients and all servers.

●

ComputeReceiveTimeServer = 10
The compute receive time is the time it takes a server to process an incoming
message and determine what to do next with it. The compute receive time is the
same for all clients and all servers.

●

connectionTableSizeServer = 250
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The Macalester College's email and web server both use a maximum number of
connections of 250.
●

timeoutServer = 300000
The timeout value for a connection is 30 seconds. If an ack is received, then the
timeout event is removed from the events heap. Else, the timed-out connection is
removed from the connection table. Once a connection has been established, it
cannot be timed out. The Macalester College's email server has a timeout value of
30 seconds.

●

inQueueSizeServer = 500
500 messages can be received at one time. Since the size of the connection table is
250 and it takes only 1 millisecond to process a message, a message queue of size
500 is deemed to be more than enough. Moreover, in a real server, each data
message (for example a web page hit) usually takes only one buffer space in the
queue.

●

outQueueSizeServer = 500
The outbound message queue is the same as the inbound message queue. Usually,
the inbound message queue is the one that receives the most messages, especially
during an attack, while the outbound message queue will usually not get full
because if the server can process a message and create a new connection, the
outbound message queue should not be too overloaded.

●

numClientsGood = Variable
This is a variable and indicates the number of good clients in the simulation.
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●

computeSendTimeClientGood = 10

●

computeReceiveTimeClientGood = 10

●

connectionTableSizeClientGood = 50
A good client can create a maximum number of 50 connections at any one time.
This should be more than enough for this simulator.

●

timeoutClientGood = 300000
The timeouts for connections for the clients are also the same as for the server.

●

inQueueSizeClientGood = 100
Since the maximum number of connections is 50, a queue size of 100 is deemed
to be plentiful.

●

outQueueSizeClientGood = 100
The outbound message queue is the same as the inbound message queue.

●

intervalTimeClientGood = 200000
A good client tries to establish a new connection with the same server on a mean
time of 20 seconds. This time is arbitrary and was chosen because the average
user on an average computer will be trying to establish a new connection on an
average of 20 seconds. Moreover, since the simulation is run for 30 minutes, this
will give a total of about 90 connections per good client. This time follows the
exponential random distribution mentioned above.

●

resetTimeClientGood = 600000
Since a good client send an initial connect request about every 20 seconds, after a
mean time of 60 seconds, it will send the reset. This will give on average 3
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connections per client in the server's connection table. The reset is always sent 60
seconds (mean time) after the acknowledgment back to the server from the client
is sent.
●

numClientsEvil = Variable
The number of evil clients in the simulation. This can be varied as needed.

●

computeSendTimeClientEvil = 10

●

computeReceiveTimeClientEvil = 10

●

connectionTableSizeClientEvil = 5000
Since an evil client tries to establish a lot of connections and those are never reset,
a table size of 5000 is chosen. Although this might be on the extreme side, it is to
be sure that the evil client's connection table is never full (else what's the point of
it being evil?).

●

timeoutClientEvil = 300000
The timeout is still set to 30 seconds.

●

inQueueSizeClientEvil = 100
Although a big connection table is needed, a message queue size of 100 is
sufficient since each message takes about 1 millisecond to process.

●

outQueueSizeClientEvil = 100

●

intervalTimeClientEvil = 40000
As will be discussed later in chapter 3, the optimal1 value is 4 seconds.

1 Optimal means a value such that it is not extreme on either the high side or the low side. In this case,
optimal means that the evil clients will send an initial connect request at a rate that will not completely
overwhelm a server nor at a rate too low that the evil clients do not send enough messages to overload a
server.
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●

resetTimeClientEvil = -1
An evil client never sends a reset message. Therefore, once an evil connection has
been established in the server's connection table, it will never be removed.

Although there are a lot of parameters, only two of them are variables – number of
evil clients and number of good clients.
The times that follow an exponential random distribution are delayTime,
intervalTime, and resetTime.

2.5 Sample Output

A sample output given the parameters from Chapter 2.4.5, for both verbose and
non-verbose mode, is given in Appendix A.

2.6 Useful Statistics

A total of 39 types of statistics are gathered for each simulation run. However, not
all 39 are really useful, depending on the runs and test cases. A complete list of all the
measurements collected is given in Table 2. Most of them are self-explanatory. A
description is given for any ambiguous ones.
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Time Independent Data

Data collected each
time such an event
occurs

Total number of inbound total messages
Total number of inbound good messages
Total number of inbound evil messages
Total number of inbound dropped total messages
Total number of inbound dropped good messages
Total number of inbound dropped evil messages
Total number of outbound total messages
Total number of outbound good messages
Total number of outbound evil messages
Total number of oubtound dropped total messages
Total number of outbound dropped good messages
Total number of outbound dropped evil messages
Total number of connections

This reprensents the
total number of
connections attempted
(whether they are
created or not)

Total number of good connections
Total number of evil connections
Total number of dropped connections
Total number of dropped good connections
Total number of dropped evil connections
Total number of established connections
Total number of established good connections
Total number of estbalished evil connections
Total number of reset connections
Total number of reset good connections
Total number of reset evil connections
Total number of timeouts
Total number of good timeouts
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Total number of evil timeouts
Total number of errors
Total number of good errors
Total number of evil errors
Time Dependent Data

Data collected at every
measurement interval

Average size of inbound message queue with all messages
Average size of inbound message queue with good messages
Average size of inbound message queue with evil messages
Average size of outbound message queue with all messages
Average size of outbound message queue with good messages
Average size of outbound message queue with evil messages
Average size of connection table with all connections
Average size of connection table with good connections
Average size of connection table with evil connections
Table 2: Measurements

Measurements are collected only at the server side since we are only interested in
analyzing the performance of the server.
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3. Simulation Runs

3.1 Test Runs

All the runs are performed using the parameters given in Chapter 2.4.5. When the
parameters are not the same as shown in that chapter, the parameters used will be shown.
The statistics are gathered as in Chapter 2.6.
Each simulation test case is run ten times to avoid any statistical fluctuations. Two
outliers are removed, and the average of the remaining runs are taken. That average is
used as the final measurement for that particular run.

3.2 Goals

The main goals of this thesis' simulation are to maximize the availability and
serviceability of the server with regards to the good clients, while blocking or limiting the
attack from the evil clients.
The total number of established good connections, total number of dropped evil
connections, average number of connections (to maximize usage of the server), and
average number of good connections will all be maximized, while the total number of
evil connections, total number of dropped good connections, and average number of evil
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connections will all be minimized. The total number of good timeouts, the total number
of good errors, and the total number of reset good connections should not vary too much
from the base case.

3.3 Base Case

3.3.1 What is a Base Case?

There will be two base cases, but they both have the same definition. A base case
in this paper means the very basic statistics gathered using a set configuration of
parameters. The base case will be used for comparison to determine if any
features/improvements/new defense techniques/changes in parameters help the goals
mentioned in Chapter 3.2.

3.3.2 Base Case 1 – Number of Good Clients

In this case, there are no evil clients, and the parameters are as shown in Chapter
2. The number of good clients is varied, until the load on the server is right. “Right”
meaning that the server is busy enough and is neither swamped nor has nothing to do for
periods of time (this can be deduced by the amount of free space in the connection table).
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It is possible that the server will not be able to service all requests even if there are only
good clients. This is acceptable.
Number of Good Clients
1
4
16
32
# of Inbound Messages
267 1051 4146 8577
# of Good Inbound Messages
267 1051 4146 8577
# of Evil Inbound Messages
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Inbound Messages
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Good Inbound Messages
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Evil Inbound Messages
0
0
0
0
# of Outbound Messages
91 355 1399 2898
# of Good Outbound Messages
91 355 1399 2898
# of Evil Outbound Messages
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Outbound Messages
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Good Outbound Messages
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Evil Outbound Messages
0
0
0
0
# of Attempted Connections
91 355 1399 2898
# of Good Attempted Connections
91 355 1399 2898
# of Evil Attempted Connections
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Connections
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Good Connections
0
0
0
0
# of Dropped Evil Connections
0
0
0
0
# of Established Connections
89 349 1377 2864
# of Established Good Connections
89 349 1377 2864
# of Established Evil Connections
0
0
0
0
# of Reset Connections
86 342 1351 2788
# of Reset Good Connections
86 342 1351 2788
# of Reset Evil Connections
0
0
0
0
# of Timeouts
0
0
0
0
# of Good Timeouts
0
0
0
0
# of Evil Timeouts
0
0
0
0
Number of Errors
1
5
18
28
Number of Good Errors
1
5
18
28
Number of Evil Errors
0
0
0
0
Average Size of Inbound Queue
0
0
0
0
Average Size of Inbound Queue (Good)
0
0
0
0
Average Size of Inbound Queue (Evil)
0
0
0
0
Average Size of Outbound Queue
0
0
0
0
Average Size of Outbound Queue (Good)
0
0
0
0
Average Size of Outbound Queue (Evil)
0
0
0
0
Average Size of Connection Table
2
12
48
99
Average Size of Connection Table (Good)
2
12
48
99
Average Size of Connection Table (Evil)
0
0
0
0
Table 3: Base Case 1 - No evil clients
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64
80
96
128
17031 20233 22193 25221
17031 20233 22193 25221
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5751 6691 6974 7059
5751 6691 6974 7059
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5752 7104 8508 11367
5752 7104 8508 11367
0
0
0
0
1
413 1534 4308
1
413 1534 4308
0
0
0
0
5697 6626 6902 6990
5697 6626 6902 6990
0
0
0
0
5542 6452 6727 6809
5542 6452 6727 6809
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
41
51
57
54
41
51
57
54
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
199
233
240
245
199
233
240
245
0
0
0
0

As shown in Table 3 and Figure 13, there are no dropped connections until there
are 64 good clients. Moreover, there are no dropped messages. The errors are due to a
reset from a client to the server arriving before the acknowledgment. The number of
errors increases as the number of good clients increases because if one good client causes
one error to occur, two good clients should cause two errors to occur. It is not exactly
linear due to statistical fluctuations. Moreover, the number of reset connections plus the
number of errors is approximately equal to the number of established connections, which
by the definition of an error, is correct. The number of incoming messages does not
increase linearly when there are dropped connections because an acknowledgment or
reset message counts towards the number of inbound messages. It is also interesting to
note that the number of dropped connections plus the number of outbound messages is
equal to the number of connections. Each connection that was not dropped should create
one and only one outbound message – the acknowledgment back to the client.
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Number of Dropped Connections

Dropped Connections vs Good Clients
16000
15000
14000
13000
12000
11000
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1

2

4

8

16

32

64

80

96

128 256

Number of Good Clients
Figure 13: Number of Dropped Connections vs Number of Good Clients

The optimal value for the number of good clients is 80. With 80 good clients and
no evil clients, the server will be busy with requests, as shown by almost full connection
table on average (233/250 = 93.2%), but not so busy that everything grinds to a halt
because only 5.8% (413/7104) of the total number of connections are dropped.

3.3.3 Base Case 2 – Evil Clients come in!!

80 good clients is a base case, but evil clients need to come in the picture. The
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second base case is where there is only one evil client. Only one evil client is used
because you need to start somewhere. As will be seen later, more evil clients are added.
The optimal value of the mean interval time of initial connect requests for evil clients will
now be determined using 80 good clients and one evil client. The optimal value with
regards to the evil clients would of course be the lowest value possible, with clients
bombarding a server with messages as often as possible, and the optimal with regards to
the server would be the highest value possible so that the server receives very few
requests and is thus available for other requests as long as possible. Thus the optimal
value would be one to strike the balance between those two extremes.
As shown in Figure 14 and Appendix A, the optimal value chosen for the mean
interval time for evil clients is 40,000 time units, which is 4 seconds. Therefore, on
average, an evil client will send an initial connect request every four seconds to the
server. Four seconds was chosen because out of 7124 good connections, 3943 (55.3%)
good connections were dropped. The average size of the connection table is also 243
(97.2%), with about half of them good and half evil. From Figure 14, it can be seen why
the mean time of four seconds was chosen – the server is neither too busy that nothing
can really help nor too idle that no noticeable improvements can be performed.
The number of established good connections decreases exponentially and the
number of dropped good connections increases logarithmically as the mean interval time
decreases. This is due to the exponential distribution. This causes a lot of good clients
being denied service, while the single evil client hogs up all the resources. Moreover, evil
clients do not reset their connections, thus the evil connections stay in the server's
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connection table for the whole duration of the simulation. The number of errors does
decrease because as fewer clients can create new connections, the probability of a reset
message arriving before an acknowledgment message decreases.

Number of Connections

Good Connections vs Interval Time
7500
7000
6500
6000
5500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0

Good Connections
Drop Good
Connections
Established
Good Conns

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

Mean Interval Time
Figure 14: Number of Good Connections vs Mean Evil Interval Time

3.3.4. Message Queue always Empty?

For all the runs completed so far, the average size of the message queues (both
inbound and outbound) has always been empty, and there have not been any dropped
messages whatsoever.
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A reset time of 6 seconds (60000 time units) was used for this run, with no evil
clients, and it can be seen from Figure 15 that as the number of good clients increases, the
server becomes so overloaded that messages start getting dropped and chaos occurs. The
outbound message queue never gets full because it can never happen that there are more
outbound messages at any time than the size of the connection table.

Dropped Messages vs Clients
Number of Dropped Messages

650000
600000
550000
500000
450000
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
0

10000

20000

30000

40000

Number of Clients
Figure 15: Number of Dropped Messages vs Number of Clients

The number of dropped incoming messages and the average size of the inbound
message queue increases exponentially when there are more than 16,000 clients, and
everything grinds to a halt. The number of established connections drops from 21311 to
654. The number of timeouts also increases because as messages get dropped, sometimes
an acknowledgment would get lost as well.
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3.4 Defenses

The parameters provided for the simulation are held constant since these are the
real values that some servers in the real world use. The only way to try to improve the
serviceability of the server while under attack is to introduce new features in the
simulation. The three defense features to be implemented are
●

Priority Queue
Instead of using a first in first out (FIFO) message queue, a priority queue is used
instead, to give higher priority to the messages from clients which do not have too
many connections in the table at the time.

●

Limit the number of Connections
Each client can only create a certain amount of connections at any time.

●

Server Reset
The server performs a reset when its connection table gets full.

52

4 Experiment 1 – Using a Priority Queue

4.1 Goals

In the first experiment, a priority queue is used instead of a First In First Out
queue for the inbound message queue for the server. Only the inbound message queue is
changed since this is the bottleneck as described in the Base Case. All messages will be
given a priority based on how many connections they currently have on the server. It does
not matter whether a client has 10 in progress connections or 10 established connections
– in both cases, the client will be counted as having 10 connections.
A cutoff point (call it x) is used. Clients that have more than x connections will be
given a low priority, while clients that have at most x connections in the server's
connection table will be given a high priority. Only two priorities are used since there are
only two types of clients – good and evil. The priority queue will function as a heap, with
highest priority messages at the top and lowest priority messages at the bottom.
The main reason behind using a priority queue instead of a FIFO queue is that evil
clients will generally have a lot of connections in the connection table, as compared to the
good clients. Thus, all messages from evil clients will end up at the end of the queue.
Therefore, good clients are expected to receive better performance and evil clients'
messages are blocked or slowed down at the inbound queue. The expectation is that the
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number of established good connections would go up, and the number of dropped good
connections and established evil connections would go down.
The optimal value of that cutoff point x will be determined to see if any
improvements have been made.

4.2 New Parameters

Two new parameters are introduced for this new feature. They are shown in Table
4.
useFIFOQueue

false

Whether or not to use the FIFO queue

NumCutOffPriority

0

The priority cutoff point x to be used. Of
course, a negative value does not make sense

Table 4: New Parameters for Experiment 1

4.3 Runs

The simulator was run using the same parameters as mentioned before, except that
a priority queue is now used instead. The cutoff point is varied to determine if there is an
optimum value.
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Cutoff
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Total Connections
7637 7604 7623 7555 7619 7583 7600 7591
Good Connections
7177 7157 7184 7102 7164 7138 7149 7146
Evil Connections
460 447 439 453 455 445 451
445
Drop Connections
4284 4258 4186 4209 4220 4104 4193 4206
Drop Good Connections
4029 4015 3947 3960 3970 3860 3944 3961
Drop Evil Connections
254 243 239 249 251 244 249
244
Total Established Connections
3318 3305 3400 3312 3359 3445 3368 3349
Established Good Connections
3112 3101 3199 3108 3155 3244 3167 3148
Established Evil Connections
206 204 200 204 204 201 201
201
Total Reset Connections
3103 3096 3187 3096 3149 3229 3157 3135
Reset Good Conns
3103 3096 3187 3096 3149 3229 3157 3135
Average Total Connections
243 243 243 243 243 243 243
243
Average Good Connections
111 111 115 110 111 114 112
112
Average Evil Connections
132 132 128 132 131 128 130
130
Table 5: Using a Priority Queue - 80 Good and 1 Evil Clients

0 Base Case
7592
7574
7143
7112
450
462
4210
4237
3965
3983
245
254
3347
3302
3143
3093
204
209
3132
3087
3132
3087
243
243
111
110
131
133

The most important statistics collected for the priority queue are shown in Table
5. The average connection size remains constant throughout all the runs, and the same
observation can be made for other test cases (as shown in Appendix A).
In the graphs to follow, the point below the 0 priority cutoff means that no priority
queue is used and represents the base case.
From Figure 16, the number of created total connections and the number of
created good connections remain more or less constant. Thus, the number of created evil
connections also remains constant. The slight decrease at priority cutoff = 5 is due to
statistical fluctuations since both the number of created total connections and the number
of created good connections decrease.

55

Connections vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 16: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (-1 is the base case)

Average Table Size vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 17: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (-1 is the base case)
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Dropped and Established Connections

Dropped and Established vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 18: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (-1 is the base case)

From Figures 17 and 18, it would seem that the optimal cutoff point is at 3
connections. The number of dropped good connections is at the lowest, while the average
number of good connections and the number of established connections are at their
highest.
However, only an improvement of 2% in the number of dropped good
connections is achieved (3983/7112 = 56% to 3860/7138 = 54%), and an improvement of
0.5% in the number of established good connections (3093/3302 = 93.7% to 3244/3445 =
94.2%), and an improvement of 1.6% in the average number of good connections
(110/243 = 45.3% to 114/243 = 46.9%).
Statistically, those percentages are not very significant, therefore more evil clients
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are added.
80 good clients and 3 evil clients are used in the next test case.

Connections vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 19: 80 Good Clients and 3 Evil Clients (-1 is the base case)
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Average Table Size vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 20: 80 Good Clients and 3 Evil Clients (-1 is the base case)

Number of Dropped Connections
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Figure 21: 80 Good Clients and 3 Evil Clients (-1 is the base case)

59

Number of Established Connections

Established Connections vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 22: 80 Good Clients and 3 Evil Clients (-1 is the base case)

From Figures 19, 20, 21, and 22, the addition of a priority queue does not seem to
help, as shown by the almost horizontal lines in all four graphs.
To prove that a priority queue does not help improve performance of the system,
more good clients are added with only 1 evil client. The results are as shown in Figures
23, 24, and 25.
1024 good clients and one evil client interact with one server. The percentage of
dropped connections is very high, as expected, since the server just gets overloaded by
connection requests. Although there is one evil client, it only has 19 connections on
average in the server's connection table. This is because the good clients greatly
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outnumber the lonely evil client.
Similar to the previous test case, Figures 25 and 26 show a graph of horizontal
lines, indicating that the priority queue does not help improve the performance of the
server. On the other hand, Figure 23 shows a display of “zig zag” lines, but these are due
to statistical fluctuations.

Connections vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 23: 1024 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (-1 is the base case)
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Average Table Size vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 24: 1024 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (-1 is the base case)
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Dropped and Established Connections

Dropped and Established vs Priority Cutoff
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Figure 25: 1024 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (-1 is the base case)

4.4 Conclusion

As discussed in Chapter 4.3, the priority queue feature did not significantly
improve the performance of the server with regards to the good clients. Although
intuitively a priority queue should help since all the evil messages are being sent at the
back of the queue, the experiment did not work because the evil messages will eventually
get to the front of the line and get processed by the server. Processing time of incoming
messages is only one millisecond, and even if good clients keep sending messages to the
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server, the latter only needs one millisecond to process an evil message, and once a
connection from an evil client has been created in the server's connection table, it stays
there forever because the evil clients do not send any resets and these connections are
never removed. Even though all the evil messages are being pushed back at the end of the
queue, once they get to the front, they will get processed by the server and a new entry
created in the table. This new entry will never be removed from the connection table, thus
the good clients are still being denied access to the server.
Moreover, a message priority queue is not known to be used on any
configurations for any servers in the real world, giving further evidence that a priority
queue might not work.
We will have to do more rigorous processing to prevent evil clients from getting
into the table in the first place.
Next, experiment 2 is going to be implemented and discussed.
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5 Experiment 2 – Limit Number of Connections

5.1 Goals

The base case allows a client to create as many connections as needed. This can
be harmful and impact performance when an evil client creates dozens of connections,
preventing other clients from obtaining a connection space in the table.
Thus, in this second experiment, the number of connections any client can have in
the server's table is limited to the limiting value x. Whenever a client tries to create a new
connection, the connection table for the server is checked to determine how many
connections that client currently has open – both in progress connections and established
connections. If the limit x is exceeded, that new connection is dropped. Else, a new entry
is created in the server's table for that connection. Only the server uses the limit since it is
the object under study.
Since evil clients never reset or remove the connections they create, they could
potentially create lots of connections in the server's table, thus denying access by the
good clients. Limiting the number of connections each client can create will hamper the
negative impacts of the evil clients. However, if the limit is too low, that would impact
the good clients in a negative way too since they won't be allowed to create more
legitimate connections. On the other hand, if the limit is too high, it would not matter that
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the limit is being used since no client will ever have that high number of connections in
the table.
The optimal value of the limit x will be determined to see if any improvements
have been made.

5.2 New Parameter

For this new feature to work, one new parameter is needed. This is shown in
Table 6.
limitNumConnPerClient 0

The limit to be used (0 means no limit), and of course, a
negative limit does not make sense
Table 6: New Parameter for Limit

5.3 Runs

The simulator was run using the same parameters as mentioned before, but with
the new parameter in Chapter 5.2 introduced. The limit is varied to determine if there is
an optimal value.
The priority queue is not used since it was shown in Chapter 4 that adding a
priority queue instead of a FIFO queue did not help improve performance on the server.
Table 7 shows the runs with 80 good clients and 1 evil client, with the most
important statistics.
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Limit
10
9
7
6
5
4
3
2
1 Base Case
Total Inbound Messages
20407 20475 20320 20548 19756 18620 16618 14094 11032
14134
Good Inbound Messages
19955 20010 19866 20094 19298 18173 16160 13635 10596
13486
Evil Inbound Messages
452 465 454
455
458 447 457
459 437
648
Total Outbound Messages
6542 6572 6520 6548 6235 5604 4583 3303 1742
3414
Good Outbound Messages
6532 6563 6513 6542 6230 5600 4580 3301 1741
3210
Evil Outbound Messages
10
9
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
204
Total Connections
7581 7588 7531 7701 7526 7622 7626 7612 7615
7559
Good Connections
7139 7132 7084 7253 7073 7179 7172 7155 7179
7115
Evil Connections
442 456 447
449
453 443 454
457 436
444
Total Dropped Connections
1039 1016 1010 1154 1291 2018 3043 4309 5873
4145
Dropped Good Connections
607 569 570
711
843 1580 2592 3854 5439
3905
Dropped Evil Connections
432 447 440
443
448 439 451
455 435
240
Total Established Connections 6478 6512 6453 6486 6166 5549 4535 3265 1714
3386
Established Good Connections 6468 6503 6446 6480 6161 5545 4532 3263 1713
3182
Established Evil Connections
10
9
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
204
Total Reset Connections
6299 6328 6283 6311 6008 5405 4418 3186 1680
3164
Reset Good Connections
6299 6328 6283 6311 6008 5405 4418 3186 1680
3164
Total Errors
49
48
54
50
56
45
38
31
23
25
Good Errors
49
48
54
50
56
45
38
31
23
25
Evil Errors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Average Total Connections
236 236 234
233
219 197 162
115
61
243
Average Good Connections
226 227 227
227
214 193 159
113
60
112
Average Evil Connections
9
8
6
5
4
3
2
2
1
130
Table 7: Limit Number of Connections - 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client

In the graphs to follow, a limit of 0 represents the base case scenario.
Figure 26 shows the attempted number of connections. Both curves are similar, as
they both have a peak at the same limit and follow the same general pattern. Although
there are some fluctuations, those are due to statistical errors. Therefore, the line can be
considered to be horizontal, which is what is expected since the number of connections
should stay approximately the same, regardless of the limiting value used.
The number of dropped connections is shown in Figure 27. The number of
established connections and the average size of the connection table are graphed in
Figures 28 and 29 respectively.
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Figure 26: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)
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Figure 27: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)
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When the limit is really low (limit = 1, 2), there are a lot of dropped connections.
This is because, each good client would have, on average, about 3 to 4 connections at any
time in the connection table of the server since every 20 seconds, it sends a new initial
request, and every 60 seconds, it sends a reset message. As mirrored in Figures 28 and
29, there are very few established connections and the connection table is pretty much
empty on average for those low limits. This is an extreme case. Figure 28 is a mirror of
Figure 27.

Number of Established Connections

Established Connections vs Limit
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Figure 28: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)

However, as the limit increases, the number of dropped connections drops
significantly. The number of established connections and the average size of the
connection table also increase dramatically. As can be seen in Figure 28, the total number
of established connections and the total number of established good connections are on
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the same line. This is because the single evil client is being hampered by the introduction
of the limit. The client is limited to the number of connections it can create, and from
Figure 29, the good clients “hog up” the whole connection table.
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Figure 29: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)

As the limit increases, the performance converges back to the base case. This is
because as more evil connections can be created, the limit does not help anymore, as the
evil client creates as many connections as possible and the good clients suffer from that.
The optimal value of the limit is 6. This is about the average number of
connections a good client will have at any time in the server's connection table.
More evil clients are added to the simulation to determine if the limit really helps
or not. The next test case contains 80 good clients and 16 evil clients.
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Figure 30: 80 Good Clients and 16 Evil Clients (0 is the base case)

Figure 30 shows that the number of connections is constant, so there are no sideeffects to be considered.
Figures 31, 32, and 33 show the total number of dropped connections, the total
number of established connections, and the average size of the connection table. They are
all very much similar to Figures 27, 28, and 29.
The base case was not very successful in diminishing the impact of the evil clients
because they were able to create so many connections, thereby reducing the effective size
of the server's connection table. As shown in Figure 33, the evil clients were taking up
most of the connection space in the table.
Therefore, the introduction of the limit helped right away, even with a low limit
since evil clients are effectively being denied.
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Figure 31: 80 Good Clients and 16 Evil Clients (0 is the base case)
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Figure 32: 80 Good Clients and 16 Evil Clients (0 is the base case)
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Average Table Size vs Limit
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Figure 33: 80 Good Clients and 16 Evil Clients (0 is the base case)

However, with a low limit, the connection table was not being used to its full
capacity, but as the limit is increased, the average size of the connection table increases to
its maximum. As the limit is increased beyond 5, the evil clients are again allowed to
hamper the server's availability.
In Figure 28, both lines overlap each other. However, in Figure 32, the “good
established connections” line is a bit below the “total established connections” line. This
is due to more evil connections being established since there are more evil clients.
With only 1 evil client, the optimal value for the limit is around 6 connections.
With 16 evil clients, the optimal value for the limit decreases to 4 connections. The same
trend can be seen as the number of evil clients increases.
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5.4 Conclusion

Limiting the number of connections a client can have in the server's connection
table does help in reducing the impact of an attack by evil clients. Moreover, the good
clients receive a boost in their ability to create new connections in the table. However, as
was shown with the two different cases in Chapter 5.3, it is very hard to determine what
the optimal value of the limit should be since there is no way of knowing who the evil
clients are.
Decreasing the limit as the number of clients increases might work if the number
of clients is increased. But a lot more tests have to be run to determine what the optimal
value should be for each number of clients. Moreover, if there are no evil clients, the
limit should not be decreased because good clients do not connect that often to the server.
Since there is no way for the server to determine whether a client is good or evil,
another method has to be found to improve the performance of the server.
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6 Experiment 3 – Server Reset

6.1 Goals

As was discussed in Chapter 4, a priority queue did not help hinder evil clients'
attack. In Chapter 5, using a limiting value to limit the number of connections a client can
create did help improve the performance of the server but it was difficult to determine
what the optimal value of the limit should be since the server does not know how many
good and evil clients there are.
The third and last experiment to be implemented is the server reset. Whenever its
connection table becomes full and a new connection needs to be created, the server will
forcefully remove the oldest established connection in its connection table, regardless of
which client created that connection. In-progress connections are not removed. If an evil
client does not acknowledge back to the server, that in-progress connection will
eventually time out.
Since evil clients never reset any of their established connections, the latter stay in
the server's connection table for the duration of the simulation. Therefore, the server will
try to shoulder the responsibility of flushing out the evil connections. The oldest
established connection is removed since this is the most likely connection to be evil.
Good clients will eventually reset their connections after about 60 seconds. The oldest
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connection is just deleted and no reset message is sent from the server to the client whose
connection is being removed. The server reset is performed only when the server's table
is full, which implies that it is busy, under attack, or under a big load of requests.
Therefore, having the server create a new message and send it will just create more
overhead for the server.
It is expected that the evil connections will get reset which will allow more good
connections to be created. However, it is also expected that some good connections will
be reset prematurely as well. If this happens, when the real reset from the client reaches
the server, this will be reported as an error.
The priority queue will still not be used in this experiment but the limit will be
implemented as well as the server reset. The limiting value will be varied to determine
whether the server reset helps in all cases, including the base case.

6.2 New Parameter

One parameter needs to be added to the parameter list to implement the server
reset. It is shown in Table 8.
useServerReset

true

Whether or not to use the server reset

Table 8: New Parameter for Server Reset
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6.3 Runs

The same parameters are used as before, except that both the limit and the server
reset are used. It will be determined whether the addition of the server reset helps
improve the performance of the server or not.
Table 9 shows a sample of the important statistics measured.
Limit
Total Connections
Good Connections
Evil Connections
Total Dropped Connections
Dropped Good Connections
Dropped Evil Connections
Total Established Connections
Established Good Connections
Established Evil Connections
Total Reset Connections
Reset Good Connections
Reset Evil Connections
Total Errors
Good Errors
Average Total Connections
Average Good Connections
Average Evil Connections

10 w/ Reset
7633
7179
454
348
4
344
7211
7101
109
7038
6938
100
687
687
237
227
9

10 6 w/ Reset
7581
7627
7139
7184
442
443
1039
760
607
365
432
396
6478
6781
6468
6733
10
48
6299
6632
6299
6590
0
42
49
312
49
312
236
229
226
223
9
5

6 1 w/ Reset
7701
7745
7253
7282
449
463
1154
5971
711
5509
443
462
6486
1745
6480
1744
6
1
6311
1710
6311
1710
0
0
50
25
50
25
233
62
227
61
5
1

1 Base Case w/ Reset Base Case
7615
7564
7559
7179
7116
7115
436
448
444
5873
0
4145
5439
0
3905
435
0
240
1714
7483
3386
1713
7036
3182
1
447
204
1680
7317
3164
1680
6897
3164
0
420
0
23
972
25
23
972
25
61
240
243
60
211
112
1
29
130

Table 9: Server Reset

As shown in Appendix A, the total number of connections for both cases –
without server reset and with server reset – for all the limit values is constant. The small
changes are only due to statistical fluctuations.
As shown in Figure 34, there are no dropped good connections for the base case
when the server reset is used. This is not quite surprising although it was expected that at
least a couple of connections would get dropped, because the server deletes the oldest
established connection when its connection table gets full.
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Figure 34: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)

For low limit values, the server reset does not help at all, but for higher values, it
helps to reduce the number of dropped connections significantly, even more than the limit
without the server reset does. However, without using the server reset, as the limit is
increased, the number of dropped connections increases, whereas with the server reset,
the number of dropped connections stays at zero. However, this is not the only measure
that is to be considered as shown later.
Figure 35 shows the number of dropped evil connections. It is analogous to Figure
34 with fewer dropped evil connections as the limit is increased, but evil connections are
still being dropped, unless the limit is really big, then it converges back to the base case.
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Figure 35: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client

Figures 36 and 37 show the number of established connections. Compared to the
base case, the limit helps decrease the number of established evil connections while the
number of established good connections increases. Using the server reset, the number of
established good connections is increased even more with the optimal value of limit.
Although the number of established evil connections also increases, the increase in the
established good connections is more significant than the increase in the established evil
connections.
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Figure 36: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)
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Figure 37: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)
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Figure 38: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)
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Figure 39: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)
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Figures 38 and 39 show the number of reset connections. With the server reset,
the number of reset good connections goes up. The extra reset good connections are due
to the server prematurely removing connections when its connection table gets full. It just
so happened that a good client's connection was the oldest established connection at that
time. The extra reset connections match the extra errors reported by the server, as shown
in Figure 40. On the other hand, evil connections, which were never reset before, are now
being removed from the server's connection table. This is the main reason why there are
more established and fewer dropped connections overall.
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Figure 40: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)

Figure 41 shows the average number of good connections in the server's table.
The average number of good connections is about the same with or without the server
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reset, except in the base case. In the latter, evil clients are effectively being removed from
the connection table all the time. However, the number of errors also goes up
dramatically.
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Figure 41: 80 Good Clients and 1 Evil Client (0 is the base case)

The same results are observed when the number of evil clients is increased. The
data is shown in Appendix A.

6.4 Conclusion

Using the server reset with no limit is a bit drastic, since good connections are
ended prematurely. Although there is no way of knowing in the current simulation
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whether that had any effect or whether the reset from the client was on its way already
when the server removed the connection, the big increase in the number of errors is
something to be analyzed deeper.
When limits are used, an even better improvement is seen when the server reset is
used, which was expected. As mentioned above, there is no way of knowing whether the
increase in errors caused any problems such as a connection ending prematurely and the
client having to reestablish the connection.
Moreover, the optimal value for the limit cannot be effectively determined for the
same reasons mentioned in Chapter 5.4.
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7 Conclusions

Distributed Denial of Service attacks are a real threat as described in Chapter 1.
They are currently generally unstoppable, and there are a lot of academic research and
government-funded research going on in this area. This thesis only analyzed a very small
portion of the whole field of DDoS attacks.
The simulation performed consisted of a lot of parameters or input values but
most of them were fixed and were obtained from the real world (Macalester College's
servers). Although a lot of statistics were taken, not all of them are applicable or mean
anything for every test case. The simulation also focuses mainly on brute force attack and
varying the number of clients – good and evil.
The base case was carefully chosen after numerous tests and analysis and was
such that the server is not completely overloaded that any defense techniques
implemented would not really help or not busy at all that any improvements by
implementing some defenses would not be noticeable. 80 good clients and variable evil
clients with an interval time of initial connect requests of 4 seconds were chosen as the
base case.
The first experiment performed was implementing an inbound message priority
queue for the server instead of an inbound first in first out message queue. As shown in
Chapter 4, the addition of a priority queue did not help improve the performance of the
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server. This was due to the fact that evil messages will eventually get to the front of the
line and once an evil connection has been created, it is never reset.
In light of the failures of the first experiment, the second experiment performed
implemented a limit. The limit value limits the number of connections each client can
have in the server's connection table at any time. As described in Chapter 5, the limit did
improve the performance of the server, but sometimes it was too extreme, such as if the
limit value is too low, there are no improvements, but in fact there are deteriorations in
the availability of the server. Moreover, if the limit value is too large, the limit is not
really used as the test case resembles the base case without the limit. Finding the optimal
value of the limit is hard because it depends on the number of clients, the number of good
clients, and the number of evil clients. However, if somehow it could be predicted in
advance how many good and evil clients there will be in the simulation, then the limit
does help a lot. The same results are observed for increasing number of evil clients.
Since evil connections stay in the connection table for the duration of the
simulation because evil clients never reset their own connections, a forced server reset is
implemented in experiment 3. Whenever its connection table becomes full and a new
connection needs to be created, the server will forcefully remove the oldest established
connection, regardless of how old it is and what client created that connection. Chapter 6
describes in more details the effects of the server reset. The main aspects of this
implementation are that the server reset along with the limit further improves the
availability of the server. Also, the limit is not as important as it was when it was used
alone as in experiment 2. Although the number of established evil connections increases,
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the increase in the number of established good connections more than offsets it. Even
with an increase in the number of evil clients, the same results are observed. The
downside to using the server reset is that the number of errors also increases. An error
means that a message arrived at the server and the latter does not know what to do with it.
In the server reset case, the increase in errors is due to a good connection being
prematurely removed, and when the reset from the client comes in, the connection has
already been deleted and the server does not know what to do with the message. With the
way the simulator has been implemented, it cannot be determined whether the connection
has been terminated prematurely or whether the client reset was already on its way when
the server deleted the connection.
The limit experiment is in fact implemented in real life: The macalester SMTP
(outgoing email) server uses a limit of 10. The server reset is also used in the real world.
It probably happened to everyone when their connection gets timed out, when logged in
to a bank's website, or when idling in an FTP session. Since no data transfer is simulated,
there is no way to set the “idle” time value, but just the oldest established connection
being removed.
In both experiments 2 and 3, the limit and the server reset were performed
regardless of who the client is. They don't try to differentiate between a good and an evil
client. Thus, there are a lot of other defense techniques that could have been implemented
and those are discussed in the next chapter.
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8 Future Work

A lot of other work could build from the simulator to examine other aspects.
Detection techniques could be implemented. There are currently a lot of ways to try to
detect when a DDoS attack is happening and also who the attacker(s) are. When that is
known, the limit could be tuned to the optimal value for each set of parameters. Also, the
server can reset only the evil connections.
A firewall could also be implemented to act like a proxy between the server and
the clients. It will thus only pass in completely established connections to the server,
thereby reducing the load on the latter. The processing time would probably be lower for
the firewall and it can have in-built mechanisms to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks.
That would be its single task which could then be optimized, in contrast with the server,
which has to be more of a general purpose service.
Multiple servers could be used to allow for greater connection space, higher
bandwidth, and the ability to cope with a larger attack force. A load balancer thus has to
be implemented which then distributes messages to all the servers in a fair way, such as
using round robin or determining which server is the least busy and giving it the message
to process.
Other attacks could also be implemented or analyzed such as the TCP SYN
exploit, LAND attack, smurf attacks, and all those other types of attacks outlined in
Chapter 1. The current simulation uses only brute force attack which might be the hardest
type of attack to defend against, but the other types of attacks are also interesting.
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Least but not last, the simulator could be extended to allow for virtual data
transfer, the four-way handshake connection termination, and other real aspects of a
network. A current simulator that possesses all those abilities will be the ns-2 simulator,
but other features can easily be added to the current simulator so that it simulates a real
traffic network.

89

9. Bibliography

1. [Carl et al, 2006] Carl, G., Kesidis, G., Brooks, R. R., Rai, S., “Denial of Service
Attack-Detection Techniques”, IEEE Internet Computing, Jan/Feb 2006
2. [Challita et al, 2004] Challita, A., Hassan, M. E., Maalouf, S., Zouheiry, A.
(2004), “A Survey of DDoS Defense Mechanisms”, Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering, American University of Beirut, Retrieved from
http://webfea.fea.aub.edu.lb/proceedings/2004/SRC-ECE-39.pdf
3. [Cheswick et al, 2003] Cheswick, W., Bellovin, S., Rubin, A., Firewalls and
Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker. Addison-Wesley Professional,
Second Edition, 2003
4. [Denial of Service, n.d.] Denial of Service (n.d.), Retrieved on May 10, 2005 from
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9_gci213591,00.html
5. [Farrow, n.d.] Farrow, R. (n.d.), “Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS)”,
Retrieved from
http://chinese-school.netfirms.com/computer-article-denial-of-service.html
6. [Forouzan, 2000] Forouzan, B. A., TCP/IP Protocol Suite. McGraw-Hill
Companies, Inc., 2000
7. [Kessler, 2000] Kessler, G. C., “Defenses Against Distributed Denial of Service
Attacks”, SANS/GIAC Security Essentials Certification, November 2000
8. [Land Attacks Still Going Strong, 2005] Land Attacks Still Going Strong (2005),

90

Retrieved on December 14, 2005 from
http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/6H00E15EUE.html
9. [Lau et al, 2000] Lau, F., Rubin, S. H., Smith, M. H., Trajkovic, L., “Distributed
Denial of Service Attacks”, 2000 IEEE International Conference on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics, Volume 3: 2275-2280, 2000
10. [Mell et al, 2000] Mell, P., Marks, D., McLarnon, M., “A denial-of-service
resistant intrusion detection architecture”, Computer Networks 34: 641-658, 2000
11. [Mirkovic et al, 2004] Mirkovic, J. and Reiher, P., “A Taxonomy of DDoS Attack
and DDoS Defense Mechanisms”, ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communications
Review, Volume 34, Issue 2, April 2004
12. [Mutaf, n.d.] Mutaf, P. (n.d.), “Defending against a Denial-of-Service Attack on
TCP”, Retrieved from
http://www.raid-symposium.org/raid99/PAPERS/ParsMutaf.pdf
13. [Oliver, 2001] Oliver, R. (2001), “Countering SYN Flood Denial-of-Service
Attacks”, Retrieved on August 21, 2001 from
http://www.tech-mavens.com/synflood.htm
14. [Rogers, n.d.] Rogers, L. R. (n.d.), “What is a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) Attack and What Can I Do About It?”, Retrieved on September 10, 2005
from http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/homeusers/ddos.pdf
15. [Stein et al, 2002] Stein, L., Stewart, J. (2002), “The World Wide Web Security
FAQ”, Retrieved on February 4, 2002 from http://www.w3.org/Security/Faq
16. [Tanenbaum, 2002] Tanenbaum, A. S., Computer Networks. Pearson Education,

91

Inc, Fourth Edition, 2002
17. [Templeton et al, 2003] Templeton, S. J., Levitt, K. E. (2003) "Detecting Spoofed
Packets", DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition Volume I: p. 164, 2003
18. [Tupakula et al, 2003] Tupakula,U. K. and Varadharajan, V., “A Practical Method
to Counteract Denial of Service Attacks”, ACM International Conference
Proceeding Series, Volume 35: 275-284, 2003
19. [Vijayan, 2005] Vijayan, J. (2005), “Port scan may not always signal attacks”,
Retrieved on Dec, 7, 2005 from
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,106849,00.
html

92

10. Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my advisor Professor Michael Schneider, and my committee
members Professor Richard Molnar and Mr. Barron Koralesky. A special thanks also
goes to Mr. Ted Fines for all the information pertaining to the Macalester network.
I would also like to thank my brother, Sebastien Chan-Tin, for his help; my
parents and Youa Yang for their love and affection; Jesse Harman, Jacob Dorer, Rita Lee,
Dang Vang, Pakou Vang, and Thao Huynh for their friendship and support during my
thesis research.
Last but not least, I convey my thanks to the OpenOffice community for such a
great product.

93

Appendix A – Raw Data and Tables

In an effort to save paper, the raw data and tables are not printed. They are
available in electronic format at the Macalester College library. You can also contact the
author at echantin@alumni.macalester.edu
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Appendix B – Code

Similar to the reason mentioned in Appendix A, the code is not printed but is
available in electronic format at Macalester College. It can also be obtained from the
author by contacting him via email at echantin@alumni.macalester.edu
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